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Abstract
We consider an M/G/1 queue in which the customers, while wait-
ing in line, may renege from it. We study the Nash equilibrium profile
among customers, and show that it is defined by two sequences of
thresholds. For each customer, the decision is based on the observed
past (which determines from what sequence the threshold is taken),
and the observed queue length (which determines the appropriate el-
ement in the chosen sequence). We construct the a of equations that
has the Nash equilibrium as its solution, and discuss the relationships
between the properties of the service time distribution and the prop-
erties of the Nash equilibrium, such as uniqueness and finiteness.
1 Introduction
Understanding customers’ abandonments from a queue is of interest for
service providers and customers. There are many applications concerning
customers’ abandonments since real-world customers are unwilling to wait
for excessive lengths of time. Applications are presented more broadly by
Mandelbaum and Shimkin [14]. Traditional queueing theory has dealt with
the analysis of queues under the assumption of a given patience distribu-
tion, and many studies have addressed models which include abandonments,
starting with Barrer [5], who studied the queue length distribution in the
M/M/s + Dw case (where D indicates deterministic patience). Sufficient
conditions for the existence of the steady-state virtual waiting time distri-
bution in the G/G/1 + Gw were later obtained by Baccelli [2, 3]. Boxma
et al. [7] showed how to determine the busy-period distribution for various
choices of the patience time distribution. Brandt and Brandt [8] also studied
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the distribution of the busy period. In particular, they gave an explicit rep-
resentation of the Laplace-Stieltjes transform of the workload and the busy
period, in the case of phase-type distributed impatience. Yet, these studies
assumed that the patience distribution was given. Here, we investigate how
these distributions are constructed by rational behavior of customers, which
are affected by factors such as individual costs and preferences. Essentially,
the patience of each customer is based on an individual optimization, that
is, the perceived balance between the costs of waiting and the benefits of
service. Since the behaviour of others has an influence on the individual
(abandonments of others shorten the individual’s required waiting time), the
mutual interactions lead us to look at the system in the standard form of a
game, and to seek the Nash equilibrium. Therefore, the patience distribution
is no longer given, but instead it results from a cost/reward model, and from
the strategic behaviour implied by it.
The seminal study that viewed queues as economic systems, and studied
the strategic behaviors within them, came from Naor [16]. Naor consid-
ered an observable M/M/1 queue, in which there is a constant reward R
from service, and a constant waiting time rate C. He showed that under
self-optimization, customers will join the queue if the number of customers
present upon arrival is less than a threshold, n n = ⌊Rµ
C
⌋. Moreover, once a
customer joins the queue, he stays until served. Hassin and Haviv [12] also
studied an M/M/1 queue, but in their case the customers have no informa-
tion about their current position in the queue (i.e., unobservable queue). The
waiting cost is the same as in Naor’s study. However, the reward is R > 0 if
service is completed in less than T time units, otherwise it equals 0. They
showed that the pure equilibrium strategy is as follows: join the queue with
some probability p and otherwise balk, and if one joined then he waits T
time units. The reason for this result is that the virtual waiting time follows
an increasing failure rate (IFR) pattern. That is, the remaining waiting time
stochastically decreases along with the time passed. This is true for every
M/M/1 queue with impatient customers, as Baccelli and Hebuterne previ-
ously showed in [3].
Mandelbaum and Shimkin [14] retained the assumptions of unobservabil-
ity, linear waiting costs and constant service reward, but instead considered
an M/M/m queue and heterogeneous customers whose waiting costs and re-
wards may vary between the different customer types. Their results indicate
that, depending on the reward to cost ratio, a customer’s best response is
to either abandon the queue upon arrival unless of course one of the servers
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is available, in which case he enters service immediately or, given the IFR
property, to never abandon and wait until receiving service. Moreover, they
proposed a case in which the solution is richer, in which customers are dis-
charged without knowing it, (see, e.g. [17]). In their proposed model, each
customer will never be served with probability 1 − q. Thus, the longer a
customer has already waited, the higher the posterior probability that he
has been discharged. It turns out that the system has an eventually decreas-
ing (and in fact unimodal) hazard rate function, which makes finite aban-
donments rational. Thus, Mandelbaum and Shimkin showed that the best
response is to either abandon at arrival, unless, of course, one of the servers
is available or to abandon after a finite time T , which is determined by the
ratio of the waiting cost and the reward. A follow up study by Mandelbaum
and Shimkin [15] considered a nonlinear waiting cost in an unobservable
M/M/m queue. They provided conditions for the existence and uniqueness
of the equilibrium, and suggested procedures for its computation.
Another important study, by Haviv and Ritov [13], explored an M/M/1
queue where the waiting cost is nonlinear and the reward from service is no
longer constant. They showed that the equilibrium strategy is to abandon
after waiting T time units in the queue (T = 0 or T = ∞ are possible).
Also, they showed that having a mixed Nash equilibrium may occur when
the ratio of the cost and reward functions satisfies certain conditions. In this
model, the waiting time has an IFR, and thus the remaining waiting time
reduces with the elapsed waiting time. However, the waiting cost is convex,
and therefore waiting becomes more expensive. The latter balances the im-
provement in the waiting time and the remaining waiting costs.
Afeche and Sarhangian [1] also study customers abandonments in an ob-
servable M/M/1 queue, where they consider pricing as a means control the
behavior of some of the customers. Cripps and Thomas [6], and Debo at
al [9], considered a discrete-time model of an observable single server queue
with homogenous customers who maximize discounted payoffs. In those stud-
ies, he server is bad (i.e. not functioning) with a given probability and good
otherwise. Both in [6] and [9], study customers strategic behavior and given
what they observe in the queue the need to first decide wether join or balk
and then decide if and when to renege. A very interesting result in the both
studies that if one reneges, then all the customers in worse positions in the
queue renege as well. Later we show that this phenomenon is also in our
study. More related work can found in [10] and [11].
So far, we have introduced a variety of models dealing with customers’
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abandonments from a queue. They vary in many ways, such as their ob-
servability level, their cost and reward functions, and number of servers.
However, all of these studies had something in common, they all assumed an
exponential service distribution1. In this study, we relax this assumption. In
particular, we consider an observableM/G/1 queue with a First-Come-First-
Served (FCFS) discipline. With the term observable we mean that everyone
can see their own position in the queue at any time, and they are able to ob-
serve service completions and abandonments made by others. Unlike the case
where the service distribution is exponential, the age in case of generally
distributed service time is meaningful. The age determines our anticipation
of the remaining time for the current service, and consequently the waiting
time. Hence, we allow customers to keep track of time.
When considering expected utility, we specify that customers have a lin-
ear waiting cost and a constant reward from service. Customers don’t have
a waiting cost while they are being served. We assume that all customers
are rational, in the sense that every customer wishes to maximize his own
expected utility, and so they will stay as long as their expected utility is
positive. Another consequence that resulted from relaxing the memoryless
service distribution is the fact that the waiting time doesn’t necessarily have
to be with IFR. As shown above, this played a major role in studies [12]-[16].
If the service distribution is with IFR, (which implies that the waiting time
distribution is also with IFR), then the solution in trivial, in which, if one
joined then he will stay forever. Thus, we focus on a case where the solution is
richer and therefore, we limit ourselves to service distributions with decreas-
ing failure rate (DFR). That is, the remaining waiting time stochastically
increases with time . In fact, in our model, we can use a weaker property.
Specifically, we require only that the service time mean residual life (MRL)
is increasing with its age. Consequently, customers’ expected queueing time
increases with the service age.
An example for service distribution with DFR is the following: Think of
a queue for purchasing train tickets from a machine. Suppose there are two
kinds of customers, those who are local and hence more experienced and on
the other hand unexperienced customers. An experience customer shouldn’t
delay more than a few seconds for buying a ticket. Thus, if after a few sec-
onds since the service began a completion hasn’t occurred, then it is highly
possible that an unexperienced customers is the one who buys the ticket and
1Except [6] and [9]. However, they focus on discrete-time model.
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hence the remaining service time is larger. We also note that, if the service
time MRL isn’t bounded then rational customers will surely abandon at some
point, since their expected utility will eventually be negative. An example
of this kind of distribution is the Pareto distribution. However, if the service
time MRL is bounded, it is possible that customers will be willing to wait
forever, given a big enough service reward. An example of a distribution of
this kind is the hyperexponential.
The rest of the paper is arranged as follows. In Section 2 we present the
model, and customers’ expected utility and strategy profile. Next, in Sec-
tion 3 we give the theoretical framework with instructions on how to obtain
the Nash equilibrium. This is followed by a numerical example. Finally, in
Section 4 we discuss and summarize our primary results.
2 Model formulation
2.1 Model description
We consider a single server queueing model in which the arrivals are ac-
cording to a Poisson process with rate λ and service times are iid generally
distributed. We denote the service time by X , and E[X ] by x¯. We also use
the notation f(·) for the pdf and F (·) for the cdf, with F¯ (·) = 1−F (·), and
the hazard function is denoted by h(·). The service discipline is FCFS. Each
customer can see his position in the queue at any moment, and he is able
to observe service completions and abandonments made by others. How-
ever, customers are not aware of events that occurred prior to their arrival.
Of course, they do not anticipate future service times. Customers can keep
track of time, and are allowed to abandon at any moment. All customers
are homonomous in their reward from service, which is denoted by V , and a
linear waiting cost, which is denoted by C. In order to complete the model
description we first present the following definition. For a non-negative ran-
dom variable X with cdf F (·), the MRL function is defined as follows:
mX(x) = E[X−x|X>x] =
∫ ∞
0
F (x+ t)
F (x)
dt, x ≥ 0
Also, let mX(∞) = lim
x→∞
mX(x). We distinguish between service distributions
in which the MRL is bounded, and those in which it is unbounded. We
assume that the service time has an increasing mean residual life (IMRL) [4].
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2.2 Utility function
For each individual the expected utility function balances the reward from
service with the expected waiting cost. Customers always take into account
their future costs, while the time they already waited is considered a sunk
cost. Each customer wishes to maximize his own expected utility; as a result,
his best response is to stay as long as the expected utility is positive. We
first consider a case where abandonments are not allowed. This will assist un
contract the utility function with abandonments. Let Gn(t) be the expected
utility function value from staying until being served, for an individual that
has n customers in front of him in the system when the current service age
is t. Clearly,
Gn(t) =
{
V n = 0
V − C(E[X − t|X > t] + (n− 1)x¯) n ≥ 1
We next present a sequence of differential equations that can be used to solve
Gn(t) for n ≥ 1.
Proposition 1. For any value of n ≥ 0, Gn(t) solves the sequence of differ-
ential equations for n ≥ 1,
G′n(t) = C − h(t)(Gn−1(0)−Gn(t)). (1)
Proof. First, one can see that Gn−1(0)−Gn(t) = CE[X− t|X > t] and hence
the RHS of Equation (1) equals C−Ch(t)E[X− t|X > t]. We also note that
E[X − t|X > t] =
∫
∞
s=t
F¯ (s)ds
F (t)
. Hence, the derivative of Gn(t) is
dGn(t)
dt
= −C
−F (t)F (t) + f(t)
∫∞
s=t
F¯ (s)ds
F (t)2
= C − Ch(t)E[X − t|X > t]
which matched the derivative presented in the proposition, and hence the
proof is concluded.
Remark 2.1. The intuition behind the proposition is as follows: Since there
is a linear waiting cost, then clearly, C should be in the derivative. Moreover,
if service completion occurs, then the expected utility changes from Gn(t) to
Gn−1(0), which happens with rate h(t).
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Deriving the expected utility in our model is much harder than the one
proposed in Proposition 1. This is because, customers have to take into
account the fact that abandonments may occur, that is, one needs to consider
the possibility that he abandons later. Nonetheless, we next show that our
expected utility function is the positive part of Gn(t). The minor difference
between the two functions shows how the possibility of abandoning later
reflects in the expected utility function. We distinguish between customers
who already observed a service completion (called type i customers) and
those who haven’t observed a service completion (type ii customers) 2. Due
to the fact that keeping track of time is possible, type i customers know the
exact service age. However, since the current service age is unknown upon
arrival, type ii customers can only estimate it. Let Un(t) be the expected
utility of a type i customer taking the optimal action in the next moment,
given that there are n others in front of him in the system and t time units
elapsed since the last service completion.
Proposition 2.
Un(t) = (Gn(t))
+, n ≥ 0
Proof. n=0 implies that an individual is already in service, and hence has
no cost. Clearly, the optimal action in the next moment is to stay. For
n ≥ 1, we first prove the proposition for n = 1 and then prove for n ≥ 2 by
induction. For n = 1, we have
U1(t) = (h(t)dtU0(0) + (1− h(t)dt)U1(t + dt)− Cdt+ o(dt))
+, t ≥ 0. (2)
If the RHS of (2) is negative, then the best response is to abandon, and
hence the expected utility is zero. If the RHS is positive, then we have the
following differential equation:
U ′1(t) = C − h(t)(U0(0)− U1(t))
where clearly, U0(0) = V . This differential equation coincides with Proposi-
tion 1, and hence U1(t) = (V − C(E[X − t|X > t] + x¯))
+. We first assume
that Un−1(t) = (Gn−1(t))
+. Based on our assumption, clearly, Un−1(0) =
(V − C(n− 1)x¯)+. Combining with
Un(t) = h(t)dtUn−1(0) + (1− h(t)dt)Un(t + dt)− Cdt+ o(dt)
2Upon arrival, everyone are type ii customers, which potentially may switch to type i
due to being present in the queue while service completion occurred.
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therefore
U ′n(t) = C − h(t)(Un−1(0)− Un(t))
and solving the differential equation complete the proof.
Remark 2.2. One can see that the only way the possibility of abandon-
ing later reflects in the expected utility function is by abandoning once the
expected utility becomes negative. Consequently, only myopic decisions are
under consideration.
Let Uˆn(t) be the expected utility of a type ii customer taking the optimal
action in the next moment, given that n other in front of him in the system
and t time units elapsed since his arrival. Formally, let N be the number
of customers in the system and A(t) be the service age, both upon arrival.
Finally, let Xn(t) follow the distribution of the service residual, given that
upon the arrival of a tagged customer there were n customers in the system
and t time units elapsed since then. That is, Xn(t)
d
= {X −A(t)|N=n}.
Proposition 3.
Uˆn(t) = (V − C(E[Xn(t)− t|Xn(t) > t] + (n− 1)x¯))
+ n ≥ 1
Proof. For n = 0 there is no cost, similar to Un(t). For n ≥ 1, we have
Uˆn(t) = Un−1(0)hn(t)dt+ (1− hn(t)dt)Uˆn(t + dt)− Cdt+ o(dt)
where hn(t) is the corresponding hazard function of Xn(t). The differential
equation is
Uˆ ′n(t) = C − hn(t)(Uˆn−1(0)− Uˆn(t))
For both Un(t) and Uˆn(t) there are differential equations with the same struc-
ture. Hence, their solutions also have the same structure, where in this case,
X is replaced by Xn(t).
Remark 2.3. The fact that service time has an IMRL implies that both Un(t)
and Uˆn(t) are decreasing with t.
Remark 2.4. the two expected utility are similar and they differ only by the
customers type. This is due to the fact that in both cases the expected waiting
time possesses the IMRL property.
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2.3 Strategy profile
As mentioned, customers’ best response differs depending on the number of
customers in front of them and which of the two different customer types
they belong to. Therefore, each pair of queue length and customer type
needs to be considered separately. Also, customers may balk, and clearly
when the queue is long enough customers will not join. This happens when
the expected utility is negative from the moment one arrives. Hence, under
the assumption of rationality of customers, there is a maximum number of
customers in the system, and it is denoted by nmax. We show how to obtain
it in section 3.2.
The customers’ strategy profile is as follows. All customers join if the
system length is less than nmax. Of course, joining customers will adapt their
strategy according to the expected utility function, which is defined by the
customer’s type and the number of customers in front of them in the queue.
Both Un(t) and Uˆn(t) are monotonically decreasing with t, and therefore the
best response is unique and hence pure. Let Tn be the time a type i customer
who has n customers in front of him in the system is willing to wait from
the moment of service completion until the next service completion occurs,
or abandonment is made by the customer in front of him. Let Sn be the
time that a type ii customer who has n customers in front of him in the
system is willing to wait from his arrival point until a service completion
occurs, or abandonment is made by the customer in front of him. For any
type of customer if, while waiting, service completion occurs, he updates his
expected utility function and consequently his best response. However if,
while waiting, the customer in front of him abandons, his best response is to
abandon as well. This is because the customer in front, who abandoned first,
gathered more information and his abandonment puts the customer behind
in the exact same position in the queue, to which the best response was to
abandon.
In conclusion, we have two sequences that define customers’ strategies.
The first one is {T1, T2, ..., Tnmax−2.} and the second is {S1, S2, ..., Snmax−1}.
The largest index value of the second sequence is Anmax−1, because it is the
largest value observed upon arrival for which one would be willing to join.
That is, if a customer joined and observed nmax customers in the system, he
would no longer join. In the first sequence, the largest index is obtained when
a customer in the nmaxth position in the queue observes service completion.
In this scenario, he has nmax − 2 others in front of him after the departure of
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the customer who just completed his service. We next show how to obtain
the values of Tn and Sn.
3 Results
3.1 Customers’ best responses
Using Propositions 2 and 3 we show how to obtain customers’ best responses,
for both type i and type ii customers, given N = n. Specifically, we show
how to obtain the sequences {T1, T2, ..., Tnmax−2.} and {S1, S2, ..., Snmax−1}.
We begin with type i customers. Before presenting and proving the following
lemmas, we note that if the MRL is bounded it is possible that finite thresh-
olds are not possible. That is, even after waiting a long time, one still benefit
from staying. Thus, there is condition on lim
t→∞
mX(t) in order to compute the
threshold values.
Lemma 1. If lim
t→∞
mX(t) >
V
C
− (n − 1)x¯, and based on the expected utility
function from Proposition 2, Tn is the value of t that solves
Gn(t) = V − C(mX(t) + (n− 1)x¯) = 0 1 ≤ n ≤ nmax−2 (3)
Otherwise, Tn =∞.
Proof. Since n < nmax−2, the expected utility for t = 0 is positive and
of course, customers will be willing to wait as long their expected utility is
positive. Recall that the service time follows IMRL and hence, the expected
utility is monotone decreasing. Moreover, the condition lim
t→∞
mX(t) <
V
C
−
(n−1)x¯, means that for some value of t the expected utility will be negative.
Therefore, by combining the last two arguments, Equation (3) has a unique
and finite solution. Otherwise, the expected utility will be positive for every
t > 0 and hence the best response is to stay forever.
Of course, the solution of equation (3) is straightforward, and hence Tn for
any possible n can be easily obtained.
Lemma 2. If lim
t→∞
mXn(t) (t) >
V
C
−(n−1)x¯, and based on the expected utility
function from Proposition 3, Sn is the value of t that solves
V − C(mXn(t) + (n− 1)x¯) = 0, 1 ≤ n ≤ nmax−1 (4)
Otherwise, Sn =∞.
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Proof. We follow the same line of argument as Lemma 1.
Solving (4) is not straightforward, mainly because obtaining the distribution
of Xn(t) is challenging. As mentioned, Xn(t)
d
= {X−A(t)|N = n}. That
is, in order to obtain the distribution of Xn(t), one must first obtain the
distribution of A(t)|N=n. Let R(t, a) follow the distribution of the residual
service time, given that the service age upon arrival is a and t time units have
elapsed since the customer’s arrival. That is, R(t, a)
d
=X−(t+a)|X>(a+t).
Therefore, by using the law of total probability, the following equation is
equivalent to (4):
V − C
∫
a
(E[R(t, a)|N = n] + (n− 1)x¯)fA(t)|N=n(a)da = 0, n ≤ nmax−1
(5)
Yet fA(t)|N=n(a) is unknown, and will be derived in the following sections.
3.2 Obtaining the maximum length of the queue
Proposition 4.
nmax = sup
{
n ∈ N : n ≤
V
C
−
∫
a
E[R(0, a)|N = n]fA(0)|N=n(a)da+ x¯
x¯
}
+ 1
(6)
Proof. We seek the largest integer value of n that obeys Uˆn(0) > 0. Thus,
after extracting n from equation (5) and applying the supremum we get the
expression in (6).
We observe that once fA(0)|N=n(a) is derived, nmax can be computed.
3.3 Markov chain underlying the process
Our motivation for using a Markov chain is mainly to obtain the pdf of the
service age for a tagged customer who observes n others in the system upon
arrival, with t time units having elapsed since then. This will eventually
allow us to find a strategy that holds for the Nash equilibrium.
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3.3.1 Markov chain state space
First, we give some general notation for the steady states of the Markov
chain:
B = {(k, a, wk+1, wk+2, ..., wn−1)}
where
• k is the number of waiting customers that observed service completion;
• a is the age of the current service;
• wi is the waiting time of the i
th customer in the system; and
• n is the number of customers in the system.
A general steady-state density is denoted by p(k, a, wk+1, wk+2, ..., wn−1), and
the probability density of having n customers in the system and a service age
of a is denoted by π(n, a). It can be derived from the steady states of the
Markov chain that
π(n, a) =
n−1∑
k=0
∫
w
p(k, a, wk+1, ..., wn−1)dw, n ≥ 1, a ∈ R
+,
We denote the marginal probability of having n customers in the system by
πn, which is derived as πn =
∫
a
π(n, a)da. We first indicate some general and
rather trivial relationships. From the arrival order, we get wn−1 < wn−2.... <
wk+1 < a. Due to the abandonment strategies, we get a < Tk for 1 ≤ k ≤
nmax−2. This is because, if a > Tk, then the k
th customer will have already
abandoned by now. There are no constraints on a for k = 0. That is, if
no-one observed service completion, the first in the queue could arrive at any
value of a. By the same argument,
wi < Si, for k + 1 ≤ i ≤ n− 1.
For further analysis we present the following definition: let the state structure
be the combination set of (n, k), where n is the number of customers in
the system and k is the number of waiting customers that observed service
completion. Since the queue length is limited, the Markov process has a
limited number of different state structures.
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Proposition 5. The total amount of Markov chain state structures is
|B(k,n)| =
nmax(nmax + 1)
2
Proof. We first claim that if there are n customers in system, then there are n
different state structures for 1 ≤ n ≤ nmax−1. What determines the number
of state structures for a given n, is the number of different possible values of
k, where 0 ≤ k ≤ n−1. That is, the values of k can be from zero to n − 1,
because even if everyone observed service completion there would still be one
in service. However, for n = nmax there are nmax−1 different state structures.
In this case, 0 ≤ k ≤ nmax−2, while the state {nmax − 1, a} is not possible.
Finally, n = 0 means an empty system, with just one state structure. The
total number can be computed as an arithmetic progression. It is equivalent
to the sum
∑nmax
i=1 i, where each value of i represents the amount of state
structures for a given n, except i = nmax, which in this case includes cases
for both n=0 and n=nmax. From here the result is straightforward.
3.3.2 Finding the steady-state densities
Due to the complexity of the process we begin with a simple example. Let us
consider state (0, a), which refers to an active server with a current service
age a and an empty queue. For a < S1,
p(0, a) = p(0, 0)e−λaF¯ (a) (7)
Equation (7) justifies the following. State (0, a) will always follow state (0, 0).
This means that state (0, 0) occurred, and during the intervening a time units
there were no service completions and no arrivals. Thus, the probability
density of p(0, a) is as for p(0, 0), times the probability that there were no
service completions nor arrivals. However, for a > S1, we allow arrivals to
occur from the beginning of service, assuming that they will have abandoned
by the time the service reaches age a. For mS1 ≤ a < (m + 1)S1, where
m ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3...}, it is possible that a customer will arrive and abandon after
S1 time units. If, during the stay of the new arrival, more customers arrive,
then they will not be in the queue once he abandons. This is because, if they
stayed until then, they would abandon as well, since the customer ahead
of them abandoned. This process can happen no more than m times, for
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a < (m+ 1)S1. For example, if m = 1, which means S1 < a < 2S1, then two
cases are possible: no arrivals at all and no service completion, or one arrival
who abandoned before the state reaches (0, a) and no service completion.
From basic probability we obtain
p(0, a) = p(0, 0)(e−λa + λe−λa(a− S1))F¯ (a)
Thus, p(0, a) is equal to p(0, 0) times the probability that no service comple-
tion occurs and there were from 0 to m arrival events followed by abandon-
ments. We next give a general expression. Let g(k, n,m, a) be
g(k, n,m, a) =


(∑m
j=0
λje−λ(a−jSn)(a−jSn)j
j!
)
F (a) 1 ≤ k+1=n ≤ nmax−2(∑m
j=0
λje−λ(wn−1−jSn)(wn−1−jSn)j
j!
)
F (a)
F (a−wn−1)
1 ≤ k+1<n ≤ nmax−1
F (a)
F (a−wn−1)
n = nmax
and
m ∈
{
N0 k = 0
{0, 1, 2, ...
⌊
Tk−Sn
Sn
⌋
} 1 ≤ k ≤ nmax − 2
where a is the current service age, wn−1 represents the waiting time of the
last joining type ii customer who observed n − 1 customers in the system
upon arrival. n is the number of customers in the system, and m relates to
the possible values of a: specifically, mSn < a < (m+ 1)Sn. Lastly, k is the
number of customers who observed service completion.
Lemma 3. The function g(k, n,m, a) is represented differently in three cases.
Case 1, with 1 ≤ k+1=n ≤ nmax−2, represents the probability that the cur-
rent state is (k, a), given that a time units ago the state was (k, 0).
Case 2, with 1 ≤ k+1 < n ≤ nmax−1, represents the probability that the
current state is now (k, a, wk+1...wn−2, wn−1), given that wn−1 time units ago
the state was (k, a−wn−1, wk+1−wn−1, ..., wn−2−wn−1, 0).
Case 3 represents the probability that the current Markov state is (k, a, wk+1..., wnmax−2, wnmax−1),
given that wnmax−1 time units ago the Markov state was:
(k, a−wnmax−1, wk+1−wnmax−1, ..., wnmax−2−wnmax−1, 0).
Proof. Case 1: in order that the state (k, 0) will be replaced by the state
(k, a) after a time units, we need to ensure that there will not be a service
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completion during those a time units. Also, we need to ensure that there will
not be any new arrivals, or if there are, then they will have abandoned by
the time the Markov chain state reaches (k, a). The probability of no service
completion is F¯ (a). The probability of not having new arrivals once the state
reaches (k, a) is
m∑
j=0
λje−λ(a−jSn)(a− jSn)
j
j!
Of course, scenarios which include more than one abandonment made by
the (n+ 1)th customer in the system are under consideration, where j is the
number of times it occurs. We also note that j ≤ m.
Case 2: in order that the state (k, a−wn−1, wk+1−wn−1, ..., wn−2−wn−1, 0) will
be replaced by the state (k, a, wk+1...wn−2, wn−1) after wn−1 time units, we
need to ensure that there will not be service completion and no new arrivals
which stayed during that time (similar to Case 1). The probability that there
will not be service completion is P(X > a|X > a − wn−1), which is equiva-
lent to F¯ (a)
F¯ (a−wn−1)
. In Case 3, new arrivals are not a possibility anyway, and
therefore, in order that the state will be transposed from (k, a−wnmax−1, wk+1−
wnmax−1, ..., wnmax−2−wnmax−1, 0) to (k, a, wk+1..., wnmax−2, wnmax−1), we only need
to ensure that there will be no service completion, which is F¯ (a)
F¯ (a−wn)
as in Case
2.
Hence, from Lemma 3 we have, for mSn ≤ a ≤ (m+ 1)Sn,
p(k, a, wk+1, ..., wn−1)=p(k, a−wn−1, ..., wn−2−wn−1, 0)g(k, n,m, a) (8)
From (8) we see that it is possible to separate the expression of the steady-
state densities of the Markov chain into two parts. The first one is also a
steady-state density of the Markov chain, for which the last argument is set to
be 0. The second is the function g(k, n,m, a), which is computable given the
model parameters. Therefore, in order to obtain the steady-state densities
of the Markov process we need to find those in which the last argument is
set to be 0. From the balance equations,
λπ0 =
∫
a
p(0, a)h(a)da (9)
λp(k, a, wk+1, ..., wn−1) = p(k, a, wk+1, ..., wn−1, 0) (10)
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∫
a
n−1∑
i=0
p(i, a, wi+1, ..., wn+1)h(a)da = p(n, 0) (11)
Recall from Proposition 5 that the number of state structures is nmax(nmax+1)
2
.
Excluding the state 0 for each state structure, there is single state for which
the argument is 0. Therefore, from equations (9) to (11) we have nmax(nmax+1)
2
equations. Where in fact from (9) consist one Equation, (10) consist nmax(nmax−1)
2
+
2 and (11) consist nmax−3 equations. Combined with (8) and the fact that∑nmax
n=0 πn = 1, all the steady states of the Markov process is derived.
Remark 3.1. For numerical computations, we guess a value for π0. Using
equations (8) to (11), we compute
∑nmax
n=0 πn. If the total sum is smaller than
1, we guess a larger number for π0 and vice versa.
We next give a special case where nmax=3. There are 6 different state struc-
tures, and they are represented as {(0), (0, a), (0, a, w1), (1, a), (1, a, w2), (0, a, w1, w2)}.
From balance equations we state that
λπ0 =
∫ ∞
a=0
p(0, a)h(a)da (12)
Also,
λp(0, a) = p(0, a, 0) (13)
λp(0, a, w1) = p(0, a, w1, 0) (14)
∫ ∞
a=0
∫ A1∧a
w1=0
p(0, a, w1)h(a)da = p(0, 0) (15)
∫ ∞
a=0
∫ S1∧a
w1=0
∫ S2∧w1
w2=0
p(0, a, w1, w2)h(a)da = p(1, 0) (16)
λp(1, a) = p(1, a, 0) (17)
Using equations (8) and (12) to (17), and applying the numerical procedure
from Remark 3.1, all steady states can be computed.
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3.4 The age distribution given the queue length
We next show how to obtain fA(t)|N=n(a), while using the steady-state prob-
ability densities of the Markov chain. Before doing so, we would like to
emphasise it’s complexity. Suppose a tagged customer arrived and observed
one customer in the queue and one in service. This could result in many
cases, for example, the system was empty, then one arrived and enter service
and then another another arrival occurred. A different example, could be just
like the previous one, only now, another customer arrived prior to the tagged
customer’s arrival and then abandoned. Of course, there can be many cases
to consider and they get more complicated as the queue gets longer. For
each scenario the age distribution will be computed differently. Although,
it seems very complicated, we next show how via a few simple probability
operations it can be done.
Let Y follow the distribution of the total amount of time a tagged customer
waited from arrival until either he abandons or there was service comple-
tion, sampled by an outside inspector at an arbitrary moment. In fact,
{A(y)|N=n}
d
= {A|N=n,Y =y}. From Bayes’ law,
fA|N=n,Y=y(a) =
fY |N=n,A=a(y)fA|N=n(a)∫
a
fY |N=n,A=a(y)fA|N=n(a)da
. (18)
Since the presentation in a general case is implicit, we demonstrate using a
special case of nmax = 3. However, we can proceed similarly for any value
of nmax. We show separately how to obtain fA|N=n(a) and fY |N=n,A=a(y)
for both N = 1 and N = 2. fA|N=n(a) can be derived directly from the
steady-state densities of the Markov process, specifically for N = 1,
fA|N=1(a) =
p(0, a)
π1
and for N = 2,
fA|N=2(a) =
p(1, a) +
∫ S1 ∧ a
w1=0
p(0, a, w1)dw1
π2
We next derive fY |N=1,A=a(y). Let Q be a random variable that represents
the inter-arrival times. Of course, Q ∼ Exp(λ). Due to the PASTA property,
an outside inspector sampling times is equivalent to customer arrival times.
Therefore, Q|Q ≤ R(0, a) ∧ S1 is equivalent to Y |N =1, A=a.
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Lemma 4. The conditional density of Y given A=a, N=1 is
λe−λy F¯ (a+y)
F (a)
P(Q ≤ S1 ∧ R(0, a))
and
P(Q ≤ S1 ∧ R(0, a)) =
∫ S1
r=0
(1− e−λr)dr +
∫ ∞
r=S1
(1− e−λS1)dr
Proof.
P(Q ≤ y|Q ≤ R(0, a) ∧ S1) =
P(Q ≤ y,Q ≤ R(0, a) ∧ S1)
P(Q ≤ R(0, a) ∧ S1)
We give explicit expressions for both numerator and denominator.
The numerator is
P(Q≤y,Q≤ R(0, a) ∧S1) =
∫ y
r=0
P(Q≤r)
f(a+ r)
F (a)
dr +
∫ ∞
r=y
P(Q≤y)
f(a+ r)
F (a)
dr
and the denominator is
P(Q ≤ R(0, a) ∧ S1) =
∫ S1
r=0
P(Q ≤ r)
f(a+ r)
F (a)
dr +
∫ ∞
r=S1
P(Q ≤ S1)
f(a+ r)
F (a)
dr
After taking the derivative, we get the pdf of Q|Q ≤ R(0, a)∧ S1, and hence
of Y |N =1, A=a as well.
We next derive fY |N=2,A=a(y). Let W1 be a random variable taking value of
w1 given that the state is (0, a, w1), sampled at an arbitrary moment. The pdf
of W1 is denoted by fW1(w1), and it is equivalent to
p(0,a,w1)
∫ S1
∧
a
u=0 p(0,a,u)du
. When
a customer arrives to a system given that N = 2, there are two possible
state structures: i. p(1, a) and ii. p(0, a, w1). Let I be an indicator that
receives the value of 1 when the state structure is p(1, a), and receives 0
when it is p(0, a, w1). From simple probability considerations, P(I = 1) =
p(1,a)
p(1,a)+
∫ S1
∧
a
w1=0
p(0,a,w1)dw1
. We indicate that Q|Q ≤ R(0, a) ∧ S2 ∧ (I(T1 − a) +
(1− I)(S1 −W1)) is equivalent to Y |N=2,A =a.
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Lemma 5. The conditional density of Y given A = a, N = 2 and
Y < (I(T1 − a) + (1− I)(S1 −W1)) ∧ S2 ∧R(0, a) is
P(I = 1)
λe−λy F¯ (a+y)
F (a)
P(Q ≤ S2 ∧R(0, a) ∧ (T1 − a))
+
P(I = 0)
∫ S1
w1=0
λe−λy F¯ (a+y)
F (a)
P(Q ≤ S2 ∧R(0, a) ∧ (S1 − w1))
p(0, a, w1)dw1
and
P(Q ≤ S2 ∧ R(0, a) ∧ (T1 − a)) =∫ (T1−a)∧A2
r=0
P(Q ≤ r)
f(a+ r)
1− F (a)
dr +
∫ ∞
r=S2∧(T1−a)
P(Q ≤ (T1 − a) ∧ S2)
f(a+ r)
F (a)
dr
and
P(Q ≤ S2 ∧R(0, a) ∧ (S1 − w1)) =∫ (S1−w1)∧S2
r=0
P(Q≤r)
f(a + r)
F (a)
dr+
∫ ∞
r=(S1−w1)∧S2
P(Q≤(S1−w1) ∧S2)
f(a+ r)
F (a)
dr
The proof is given in Appendix A.
3.5 Relations between the thresholds
In this section we refer to some trivial and nontrivial results concerning the
values of the sequences {S1, S2, ..., Snmax−1} and {T1, T2, ..., Tnmax−2}. Specif-
ically, we describe the dependencies and boundaries between them. Intu-
itively, the more customers are in front of you, the less you would be willing
to wait.
Lemma 6. If Ti <∞, Tn > Tn+1 for 1 ≤ n ≤ nmax−3.
Proof. Recall that t in equation (3) refers to the time one waited in the queue
since service completion. Due to the fact that E[X − t|X > t] is increasing
with t, it follows straightforwardly that the larger the value of n the lower the
value of t that solves the equation, and hence the lower the value of Tn.
Lemma 7. If Sn <∞, Sn > Sn+1 for 1 ≤ n ≤ nmax−2.
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Proof. Suppose an individual observed n + 1 customers upon arrival. The
last event prior to his arrival could be either an arrival, an abandonment
or a service completion. If it were an arrival, then clearly the one who
observed n customers was in a better situation when he arrived. If it was an
abandonment, then this individual (if he knew) should not join at all, and
hence he is in a worse situation than the one who observed n upon arrival.
The last case is that where the arriving customer is the first to arrive during
the current service period. In this case, the age of the service time is his inter-
arrival time. Yet, we claim that the greater the queue length, the smaller
the probability of such an event. This is because, after service completion
when there are either n or n + 1 customers in the system everything is the
same except one thing. In the n + 1 system, the last customer can also
reach his abandonment time (which didn’t exist in the n customers system).
Thus, the probability that an arrival will occur prior to service completion
or abandonment is indeed lower in the n + 1 customers system.
We also observe that all {T1, T2, ..., Tnmax−2} are obtained independently of
everything else. This is a direct result from equation (3), where the value of
Tn is determined by the values of the model parameter and n. Moreover, we
claim that Si, for ∀i ∈ {1, 2, ..., nmax−2}, depends only on {S1, S2, ..., Si−1}
and {T1, T2, ..., Ti}, and for i = nmax − 1, is dependent only on {S1, ..., Si−1}
and {T1, T2, ..., Tnmax−2}. This means, that one who observed i customers
upon arrival, is not effected in any way, by actions taken by customers who
were in the i + 2th position or worse in the system (that is, have i + 1 or
more customers in from of them). This result is rather surprising since at
first thought it seems that the entire history of a busy period would effect the
value of Si. But the values of Si are not affected by {Si+1, ..., Snmax−1} and
{Ti+1, ...Tnmax−2}. The intuition behind this is as follows. First, information
regarding actions that took place in previous service period are irrelevant for
the an arriving customer, because they have no impact (given the information
he observes) on his waiting time. Now, let Ci and Ci+1 be two customers who
found i and i + 1 customers upon arrival, respectively, before an arrival a
new customer, and all three arrived at the same service period. Also, assume
that the new customer found i customers in the system. Thus, Ci and Ci+1
abandoned before the arrival of the new customer. The abandonment of Ci+1
could be triggered by either his loss of patience or by the loss of patience of Ci
.recall that if one abandons those after him abandon as well. The information
that that the new customer faces is the same in both scenarios, because given
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that fact the Ci abandoned, the threshold that Ci+1 has no influence on the
state that the new customer faces.
Theorem 1. The Nash equilibrium profile is defined by two finite sequences
of thresholds, {T1, T2, ...Tnmax−2} and {S1, S2, ...Snmax−1}, each sequence for
each customer type. Within each sequence, from an individual point of view,
each threshold (e.g., the time he waits in line before reneging) is determined
by the number of customers in front of him and of course the model input.
Proof. Customers’ strategies are determined by their expected utility func-
tions. Based on Propositions 2 and 3, we claim that there are two sequences
because the different customer types have different expected utility functions,
and therefore their strategies are different as well. The sequence lengths are
a direct result of Proposition 4 and the definition of the steady states of
the Markov chain. Finally, the fact that the Nash equilibrium profile within
each sequence is defined by thresholds was already proved in Lemma 3 and
Lemma 4.
Remark 3.2. After obtaining the steady state density probabilities (see re-
mark 3.1), we now use a different scheme to compute the threshold values.
First, the values of T1, T2, ..., Tnmax−2 are computed independently directly
from Equation (3). Then, the values of S1, S2, ..., Snmax−1 are computed re-
cursively starting from S1. Thus, we guess a value of S1 and while using
Equation (18) and employing the scheme in Lemma 4 while using the steady
state probabilities that were obtained as described in Remark 3.1. If the ex-
pected utility which is computed according to Equation (4) is negative we
guess a lower value of S1 and vice versa. After obtaining S1 this goes on un-
til we obtain all values of Sn for n ∈ {1, 2, ..., nmax − 1}
3. The computations
are very complex, which is due to two main reasons. The first is that we
don’t have closed form equations. As a result, there are numerous iterations
for each value that is being computed. The second is that the density prob-
abilities functions are very complicated and are calculated differently along
the support as a result of the function g(k, n,m, a). Finally we note that the
both the procedure that was described in Remark 3.1 and in current one were
computed by using Wolfram-Mathematica software and we used a tolerance
parameter ǫ = 10−3.
3We note that although we provided in this paper the density probability of fA|N = n
for n = 1 and n = 2 only, by following the same line of thought it can obtained for every
n ≤ nmax − 1 only with a much greater complexity. Even for n = 3 (that is nmax = 4) it
gets extremely difficult.
3.6 Numerical result
We present an example where the service distribution is hyperexponential,
and the model parameters are V = 4.85, c = 1, µ1 = 1, µ2 = 0.2, p = 0.95
and λ = 3. The (symmetric) Nash equilibrium is nmax = 3, T1 = 7.73,
S1 = 7.202 and S2 = 3.13. In this example, the value of S2 is significantly
lower than S1. This is due to two reasons. The first is trivial, where one
needs to wait for an extra customer. The second is that the age distribution
is stochastically larger, which is a direct result from Lemma 7.
4 Conclusions
In this study we show how to obtain the Nash equilibrium in an observable
M/G/1 queue with abandonments. We focus on service time distributions
which have an IMRL. The Nash equilibrium is defined by two sequences
of thresholds. The values of the sequence {T1, T2, ...Tnmax−2} represents the
abandonment thresholds for customers that observed service completion, and
they are obtained by solving a linear equation. The values of the sequence
{S1, S2, ..., Snmax−1}, represents the abandonment thresholds for customers
that didn’t observe service completion, and obtaining them is much more
difficult. They can be computed recursively based on the definition of the
Markov process. The reason we are able to obtain them recursively is be-
cause customers’ decisions are not effected by future arrivals, (i.e. they are
transparent to them). In other words, from the point of view of a customer
who is in the nth position in the queue, the maximum length of the queue is
n. Also, a numerical example is given in which both sequences are computed.
Finally, we discuss three limitations of our model:
1. We assumed that customers are homogenous with respect to their ser-
vice value and waiting cost. Of course, considering heterogenous cus-
tomers is more realistic. Perhaps, a future study may extend this re-
sults, but, it is vital that a simpler solution will be obtained first to
build the foundation of such study.
2. We assumed that the time one already waited is considered to be a sunk
cost and only future waiting time is considered. In real life, this may
not always be the case. Relaxing this assumption, may have a huge
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impact on our solution due to the following reason: If one abandoned
in front of me, I no longer necessarily abandon as well. This is because,
I will not be in the exact situation as he was. This may alter the entire
strategy profile.
3. We assumed that the service distribution possess the IMRL property.
The case where the service is with IFR was already argued for. We
next discuss the case in which the hazard function is neither with IFR
or DFR. If so, we believe that a general solution cannot be obtained
due to the dependency on the service distribution.
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A Appendix A
Proof.
P (Q ≤ y|Q ≤ R(0, a) ∧A2 ∧ (I(T1 − a) + (1− I)(A1 −W1)))
=
P (Q ≤ y,Q ≤ R(0, a) ∧A2 ∧ (I(T1 − a) + (1− I)(A1 −W1)))
P (Q ≤ R(0, a) ∧ A2 ∧ (I(T1 − a) + (1− I)(A1 −W1)))
24
We give explicit expressions for both the numerator and the denominator.
The numerator is
P (Q ≤ y,Q ≤ R(0, a) ∧ A2 ∧ (I(T1 − a) + (1− I)(A1 −W1)))
=
∫ A1
w1=0
P (I = 1)P (Q ≤ y,Q ≤ R(0, a) ∧A2 ∧ (T1 − a))
+ P (I = 0)
∫ A2∧(A1−w1)
a=0
P (Q ≤ y,Q ≤ R(0, a) ∧ A2 ∧ (A1 − w1))p(0, a, w1)dw1
and the denominator is
P (Q ≤ R(0, a) ∧ A2 ∧ (I(T1 − a) + (1− I)(A1 −W1)))
=
∫ A1
w1=0
P (I = 1)P (Q ≤ R(0, a) ∧ A2 ∧ (T1 − a))
+ P (I = 0)P (Q ≤ R(0, a) ∧A2 ∧ (A1 − w1))p(0, a, w1)dw1
After taking the derivative, we obtain the p.d.f. of Q|Q ≤ R(0, a) ∧ A2 ∧
(I(T1 − a) + (1− I)(A1 −W1)), and hence of Y |N =2, A=a as well.
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